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DISCRIMINATION CASES IN THE 2001 TERM
OF THE SUPREME COURT
Eileen Kaufman'
Discrimination cases figured prominently in the Supreme
Court's docket last year, with five of the seven discrimination
cases considering the application of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA). 2 The twelve year old statute is widely
considered the most significant civil rights statute of the past
quarter century.3 In fact, the number of cases considered by the
Court led Justice O'Connor to speculate that the 2001 term could
be "remembered as the disabilities act term."4  The Supreme
Court's decisions in four of the five ADA cases continued the
Court's pattern of restricting the scope of the ADA by interpreting
the statute in a manner benefiting employers.5 However, the term
1 Professor of Law, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. B.A.,
Skidmore College, 1970; J.D., New York University, 1975; L.L.M., New York
University, 1992. Prior to serving as Vice Dean and Professor of Law at Touro
Law Center, Professor Kaufman was a Managing Attorney at Westchester Legal
Services, Inc. Professor Kaufman is a Reporter for the New York Pattern Jury
Instructions. She has published primarily in the area of civil rights law.
2 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12213 (2000)).
See Linda Greenhouse, The High Court's Target: Congress, N.Y. TIMES,
February 25, 2001, Section 4, at 3; see also Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Civil
Rights of the Handicapped in Transportation: The Americans With Disabilities
Act and Related Legislation, 19 TRANSP. L.J. 309, 310 (1991) (wherein the
author makes reference to the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 as the
most sweeping civil rights legislation in a quarter century); Stephen L. Percy,
Administrative Remedies and Legal Disputes: Evidence on Key Controversies
Underlying Implementation of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 413, 432 (2000) (citing James J. Weisman, Teeth
in the ADA, WE MAGAZINE, Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 114).
4 Charles Lane, O'Connor Criticizes Disabilities Law as too Vague, WASH.
POST, March 15, 2002, at A2. (quoting Justice O'Connor).
5 See Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002) (holding that
carpal tunnel syndrome did not qualify as a substantial limitation on a major life
activity and thus was excluded as a disability under the ADA); U.S. Airways,
Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 406 (2002) (holding that the protections afforded
under the ADA are secondary to the rights of employees under a seniority
system of personnel placement); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S.
73 (2002) (upholding an EEOC regulation that gave employers the authority to
1
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was not a clean sweep for employers because in three less
publicized but nevertheless important employment discrimination
cases, it was the employees who scored significant victories.
6
The ADA was enacted by Congress in 1990 and prohibits
discrimination against the disabled in employment, in public
services and in public accommodations. 7 Congress passed the Act
convinced that disability discrimination was a pervasive problem.
8
Among the many cases presented to Congress while it considered
enactment of the legislation were: a state's refusal to hire cancer
victims for at least five years after the patient's last treatment
because a government official mistakenly believed that cancer was
contagious; a public school's refusal to hire a deaf teacher at a
school for the deaf because she lacked listening skills; and a zoo's
terminate or otherwise reject an application to transfer job titles of an employee
with a medical condition that would worsen due to job conditions); Barnes v.
Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002) (holding that municipalities are not subject to
punitive damages in private ADA cases). The one ADA case that did not benefit
employers was EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 285 (2002), which
held that the EEOC is not barred from pursuing specific relief, such as back pay,
reinstatement and damages, in an ADA enforcement action, despite an
agreement between an employer and employee to arbitrate employment related
disputes.
6 See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002) (holding that
charges alleging hostile work environment will not be barred if filed outside the
statutory time period if all acts constituting the claim are part of the same
unlawful practice and at least one act falls within the filing period); Edelman v.
Lynchburg College, 535 U.S. 106, 108-09 (2002) (holding that petitioner's
claim that he was denied tenure on the basis of gender, national origin and
religious discrimination was not barred merely because his original claim was
not verified within the statutory period provided under §706(b) of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508
(2002) (holding that a short, plain statement alleging the grounds for
discrimination was sufficient pleading pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 8(a) to seek relief).
7 Title I of the ADA covers employment, sec. 101-108, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-
12117; Title II of the ADA covers public services, sec. 201-246, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12131-12165; Title III of the ADA covers public accommodations and
services operated by private entities, sec. 301-310, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189.
8 See Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 380 (2001)
(stating that "Congress expressly found substantial unjustified discrimination
against persons with disabilities.").
2
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DISCRIMINATION CASES
expulsion of children suffering from Down's Syndrome because
the zookeeper feared such children would upset the chimpanzees. 9
Following the enactment of the ADA, the Court was
presented with a number of opportunities to interpret the scope of
the Act as it relates to employment discrimination. The Court's
decisions have led one disability advocate to refer to the ADA as
"the incredible shrinking law." 0 In 1999, the Court held that a
person whose impairment is correctable is not disabled within the
meaning of the law." So, for example, a pilot with severe vision
problems that can be remedied by contact lenses is not disabled
within the meaning of the Act and when the airline terminates the
employee due to her impairment, she is without a remedy under the
Act.' 2 The result is the same for someone whose hypertension is
treatable with medication.' 3 This creates something of a "catch-
22" in that a person who is too disabled to work is not protected by
the Act, but a person whose disability can be remedied in a way
that permits her to work is also unprotected by the Act. And, in
another case restricting the scope of the ADA, the Court held that
Congress exceeded its power when it subjected the states to suit by
disabled workers.
14
This year's decisions serve to narrow even further the reach
of the ADA. The Court held that a person who is unable to
perform her assigned work due to carpal tunnel syndrome is not
disabled within the meaning of the Act.15 Additionally, the Court
concluded that a seniority system typically trumps the ADA's
requirement of accommodating disabled workers, 6 and that an
employer need not hire a disabled individual if the position poses
risks to the employee's own health. 17  Finally, the Court
9 See id. at 381-82 (Breyer, J, dissenting) (citing Congressional record).1o Joan Biskupic, High Court Raises Bar for ADA, USA TODAY, Jan. 9, 2002,
at A3.
11 Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999).
" Id. at 475.
3 Murphy v. United Parcel Service, 527 U.S. 516, 518 (1999).
'4 Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360.
" Toyota, 534 U.S. 184.16US. Airways, 535 U.S. 391.
17Chevron, 536 U.S. 73.
2002
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determined that disabled individuals who succeed in an ADA Title
II public entities case cannot recover punitive damages.' 8
It may appear that the Court has heard an unusual number
of cases considering the reach of the ADA. Justice O'Connor
suggests the reason for the Court's intervention is clear: Congress
simply passed the law too quickly, leaving too many uncertainties
as to what Congress had in mind. 19  According to Justice
O'Connor, speaking at the annual meeting of the Corporate
Counsel Institute, the bill's sponsors were "so eager to get
something passed" that they wrote a bill less carefully crafted than
anything "a group of law professors might put together." 20
Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams 2 '
Ella Williams worked on an assembly line at a Toyota
plant. Her job required her to use pneumatic tools and by virtue
of the use of those tools she eventually suffered pain in her hands,
wrists and arms that was diagnosed as bilateral carpal tunnel
syndrome and bilateral tendonitis. 23  Toyota attempted to
accommodate her condition, however, Williams was dissatisfied
with their efforts and commenced a lawsuit under the ADA.24 That
lawsuit was settled and she returned to work where she was placed
in a position requiring her to visually inspect cars as they passed on
a conveyor belt and to manually wipe each car with a glove.25 She
worked at that job for a few years without problems but then
Toyota added two functions to her job description requiring her to
apply and spread a viscous substance resembling salad oil on the
passing cars and then inspect each car for flaws. These additional
functions required her to hold her arms at shoulder height for
'8 Barnes, 536 U.S. 181.
19 William C. Smith, Drawing Boundaries: The Supreme Court is Siding with
Employees and Narrowing the Reach of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Is
that what the Drafters had in Mind?, 88 A.B.A.J., 49 (2002).
20 id.
21 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
22 Id. at 187.
23 id.
24 Id. at 188.
21 Id. at 188-89.
26 Toyota, 534 U.S. at 189.
[Vol 19
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several hours a day.27 Eventually, she experienced pain in her neck
and shoulders and was diagnosed as suffering from an advanced
type of carpal tunnel syndrome. As a result of the disability she
could not do her job and was fired.28 Williams sued claiming that
under the ADA, Toyota was required to provide a reasonable
accommodation and it failed to do so.
29
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Williams'
condition, carpal tunnel syndrome, which indisputably prevented
her from performing her job, was a disability within the statutory
definition, which would then obligate Toyota to provide a
reasonable accommodation. 30  The statute defines disability as a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities.31  Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) regulations define a substantial limitation as
an inability "to perform a major life activit that the average
person in the general population can perform."'3 Williams claimed
that performing manual tasks was the life activity that was
substantially limited.33
Justice O'Connor, writing for a unanimous Court, readily
agreed that Williams suffered from a physical impairment; but
found that the impairment did not substantiall limit her in the
major life activity of performing manual tasks. Using Webster's
Dictionary35 as a guide, the Court explained the standard by
defining its terms. First, the word "substantial" means
"considerable" or "to a large extent." 36 Next, the word "major"
means "important." 37  Major life activities therefore are those
activities that are of actual importance to daily life.38 In order to
27 Id.
28 Id. at 189-90.
29 Id. at 190.
30 Id. at 187.
31 Toyota, 534 U.S. at 192 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101).
32 Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Positions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act Definitions, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) (2002).
33 Toyota, 534 U.S. at 190.
4 Id. at 196.
35 WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (9th ed. 1989).
36 Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197 (citing Webster's).
17 Id. (citing Webster's).
38 id.
2002
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satisfy this test, individuals claiming to be disabled due to a
substantial limitation on the ability to perform manual tasks must
establish that they cannot perform the variety of tasks of central
importance to most peoples' daily lives. In addition, the impact
must be permanent or long term. Thus, the fact that the individual
is unable to perform the manual tasks associated with a specific job
is insufficient. 39 The Court did not reach the question of whether
working is a major life activity. In Sutton v. United Airlines, the
Court said, even assuming the answer is yes, plaintiff would have
to show an inability to work in a broad range or class of jobs, but
that kind of class-based framework is inapplicable outside the
work context.4 °
Applying that standard to Ella Williams, the Court
concluded that the tasks she needed in her job were not an
important part of most peoples' daily lives.41 The record revealed
that Williams could tend to her personal hygiene and carry out
household tasks; she could brush her teeth, wash her face, bathe,
tend to her flower garden, fix breakfast, do laundry and pick up
42around the house. Those activities, the Court said, are of central
importance to peoples' daily lives.43 The fact that she could not
sweep, dance, drive long distances, or be as active in her garden as
she desired or interact with her children, did not suffice because
those activities are not of central importance to most peoples'
lives.4
The Court's reasoning in Toyota supports a conclusion that
an impairment preventing an individual from performing her job
but does not prevent her from performing manual tasks of central
importance to most peoples' daily lives does not constitute a
disability within the meaning of the ADA.45 Moreover, we are told
this test will be applied strictly in order to prevent everyone from
being considered disabled.46 It is perfectly clear that this is the
concern driving these decisions, particularly given the statistics
39 Id. at 200-01.40 Id. (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491).
41 Id. at 200-01.
42 Toyota, 534 U.S. at 201-02.
43 Id.
44 Id.
451 Id. at 200-01.
46 Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197.
[Vol 19
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regarding the number of people suffering from repetitive stress
disorders like carpal tunnel syndrome.
Outside of the ADA context, there is a real battle being
waged with respect to ergonomic injuries and what needs to be
done to correct its effects at the workplace. Last year the Bush
Administration repealed rules promulgated during the Clinton
administration regarding ergonomic injuries.47 Eugene Scalia,48
who is the lead attorney for the Labor Department, expressed real
skepticism about these types of injuries, dismissing them as "junk
science" and "quackery. 1
The "catch-22" this decision creates is that to be disabled
within the meaning of the law, the worker's carpal tunnel
syndrome must be sufficiently crippling to prevent her from
performing basic life tasks. However, if the condition is that
crippling, she is unlikely to be able to perform the job and
therefore would not be a qualified worker under the act.' 0 As a
result, the criticism that many disability advocates raised is a type
of "goldilocks" argument where the plaintiff is either not disabled
enough or too disabled, leaving not many plaintiffs in the "just
right" category.
5 1
Disability advocates were not the only critics of this
decision. Representative Steny Hoyer (D-Md.), a. sponsor of the
ADA, wrote an op-ed piece in the Washington Post criticizing the
Court for its misreading of legislative intent and vowing to revisit
the Act to determine whether, given the Court's restrictive
interpretation, it is carrying out the Act's intended purpose.
52
47 Steven Greenhouse, House Joins Senate in Repealing Rules on Workplace
Injuries, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2001, at A19.
48 United States Associate Justice Antonin Scalia's son.
49 Dana Milbank, Recess Appointees Relinquish Title Only; Reich, Scalia Put
In Similar Jobs, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 2002, at A10 (quoting Eugene Scalia).
50 see supra note 19 (quoting Scott Burris).
51 Why Did the Supreme Court Take on Three ADA Cases at Once, 14
DISABILITY COMPLIANCE BULL. (Jan. 28, 1999).
52 Steny Hoyer, Not Exactly What We Intended, Justice O'Connor, WASH.
POST, Jan. 20, 2002, at B 1.
2002
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Chevron v. Echazabal 5 3
Mario Echazabal worked for twenty years as an
independent contractor at Chevron's oil refinery and then applied
for a job directly with Chevron.54 Chevron refused to hire him,
and, in fact, directed the contractor to fire him, because the job
exposed him to toxins, which created a health risk because he
suffered from a liver disorder.55 Chevron defended its policy of
denying employment to persons whose health would be
compromised by the job by pointing to the time that would be lost
to lateness, to the excessive turnover that would likely result, and
to the risk of tort liability and Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) violations. 56
This case, unlike Toyota, raised no question of disability.
Echazabal was clearly disabled within the meaning of the law.
5 7
The question was whether Chevron's refusal to hire him fit within
the affirmative defense available under the ADA for qualification
standards shown to be job related and consistent with business
necessity. 8  Is refusing to hire someone, or firing a worker,
because the job threatens the worker's own health, a discriminatory
act under the ADA or is it a job qualification that is both job-
related and consistent with business necessity? The statute clearly
provides that an employer may refuse to hire someone who poses a
direct threat to the health and safety of other individuals in the
workplace. 59 However, it does not have a comparable provision
for situations where the health threat is to the individual person.
The EEOC regulation provides for this exception.
60
Justice Souter, in yet another unanimous opinion, upheld
the regulation, rejecting the application of the maxim "expressio
unius exclusio alterius," which translates, more or less, into
53 Chevron v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002).54 Id. at 76.
" Id. at 76-77.
16 Id. at 83, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-666 (2000).
57 Chevron, 536 U.S. at 78 n.2.
" Id. at 78-79, 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (2000) The statute provides that
"qualification standards" may include a requirement that an individual shall not
pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace.
'9 Id. at 78-79, 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2002).
60 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2002).
[Vol 19
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"expressing one item excludes another left unmentioned.",6 1 The
Court concluded that Congress did not intend to limit the statutory
defense to situations where the worker posed a threat to other
workers on the job.6 1 Did Congress really mean that if a meat
packer refused to hire Typhoid Mary,63 he would be liable under
the ADA?
This case posed an interesting question: whether permitting
this type of "threat to self' defense constitutes just the sort of
paternalism that the ADA was intended to eliminate. The Court
declares no. Rather, the Act was intended to prevent employers
from refusing to hire classes of disabled persons "for their own
good" based on untested and pretextual stereotypes. 64 Permitting a
prospective employer to refuse to hire a potential employee based
on a direct threat to the employee's own health is not
discrimination masquerading as protection because this defense
requires an individualized assessment of the health risks posed to
this employee.65 However, the Court does not tell us how
imminent or how severe the harm must be. In a footnote, the Court
states,
[W]e have no occasion.., to try to describe
how acutely an employee must exhibit a
disqualifying condition before an employer
may exclude him from the class of the
generally qualified. This is a job for the trial
courts in the first instance.
66
61 Chevron, 536 U.S. at 80.
61 Id. at 79.
63 Mary Mallon, a cook who worked in New York, was nicknamed "Typhoid
Mary" after being diagnosed with typhoid in 1904. Despite the disease, she
moved from job to job handling food and infecting the innocent until she was
caught in 1907. She was committed to an institution until 1910. In all,
authorities attributed 51 cases and three deaths to "Typhoid" Mary." Mary
Mallon died in 1938, but not from typhoid. She was immune to the disease. See
Encarta Encyclopedia at http://encarta.msn.com/column/womenshistory.asp.
64 Chevron, 536 U.S. at 85; See also id. at 86 n.5 (referring to concerns
expressed in the legislative history of the ADA, that employers must assess the
risk exposure within the workplace as it affects a particular individual, rather
than the effect of such risks on a group or category of persons with a certain
disability).65 Id. at 86 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r)).
6Id. at 86 n.6.
2002
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Future litigation will be necessary to put some meat on this bare
bones "direct threat" standard.
One interesting comparison is to the Title V11 67 gender
cases. There, the Court has seemingly disallowed a defense based
on the need to protect female employees.68 For example, in one
case Dothard v. Rawlinson,69 the Court upheld a prison regulation
preventing women from working as prison guards in a maximum
security prison based on the presence of sex offenders in the
population. 70 The Court emphasized that its decision was not based
on harm to the women alone, but rather on the threat of harm to
others.7 1 And, in another case International Union v. Johnson
Controls,72 the Court repeated the requirement that the harm must
be to third parties in striking down an employer's policy of not
permitting women of child-bearing age from working in its battery
plant.73 Protecting the not yet conceived fetuses of the female
employees was not a bona fide occupation requirement because
such fetuses are neither customers nor third parties whose safety is
essential to the business of battery manufacturing. 74 The reasoning
of the Title VII gender cases is not adopted in Chevron and instead
the defense based on threat to the employee is upheld even though
there was no third party threatened.75
6742 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2000).
6S See, e.g., Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991)
(holding that a company policy excluding women of childbearing years from
certain jobs is sexual discrimination under Title VII unless a company can
establish that sex is a "bona fide occupational qualification").
69 433 U.S. 321 (1977).70 Id. at 336-37.
71 Id. at 336.
72 499 U.S. at 187.
73 Id. at 216-17 ("[A]voidance of substantial safety risks to third parties is
inherently part of both an employee's ability to perform a job and an employer's
'normal operation' of its business").
74 Id. at 203 (acknowledging the need to protect injury to the unborn, but
refusing to extend the bona fide occupational qualifications to prevent the
potential commission of a battery).
75 Chevron, 536 U.S. at 87.
[Vol 19
10
Touro Law Review, Vol. 19 [2003], No. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol19/iss1/6
DISCRIMINATION CASES
U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett 6
The unanimity of the last two cases is nowhere in evidence
in the third ADA case of the term, U.S. Airways v. Barnett, where
instead we find a sharply fractured Court.77 The issue in Barnett
was whether an employer's obligation to provide a reasonable
accommodation to a disabled worker is trumped by a seniority
system.78 This is one of the first times that the Court has had the
occasion to consider the reasonable accommodation requirement.79
Roger Barnett worked as a cargo handler for U.S. Airways
until he injured his back.8° He transferred to a less demanding
position in the mailroom.8 1 Two years later, U.S. Airways
announced that this position would be subject to seniority-based
employee bidding and Barnett subsequently lost his position to an
employee with more seniority. 82 Barnett sued, claiming that U.S.
Airways violated the ADA by invoking its seniority system to
trump its obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation.
83
The Supreme Court was faced with conflicting authority
from the circuit courts, with some holding that seniority systems
always trumped the disabled person's rights, and others requiring a
case by case determination. 84  The test that the Supreme Court
76 U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
77 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O'Connor and Kennedy joined
in the majority decision authored by J. Breyer. Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas
and Ginsburg dissented.
78 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 394.
79 Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (b) and (5)(A) which states in pertinent part:
The term 'discriminate' includes.., not making reasonable accommodations to
the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual
with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of the business of such covered entity.
o Barnett, 535 U.S. at 394.
81 id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 395-96.
84 Compare EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding
that the ADA does not require an employer to deviate from its
nondiscriminatory seniority policy in order to accommodate a worker) with U.S.
Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that cases
should be determined on a case by case basis).
2002
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announced forges a middle ground between these two positions.85
Justice Breyer, writing for a bare majority, an extremely bare
majority as I'll explain in a moment, concluded that a "seniority
system would prevail in the run of cases.",86 Ordinarily, the fact
that a requested accommodation conflicts with the rules of a
seniority system demonstrates that the accommodation is not
reasonable. 17  That showing entitles the employer to summary
judgment.88 However, the plaintiff has the opportunity to present
evidence of "special circumstances that make 'reasonable' a
seniority rule exception in the particular case." 89 The test is
essentially a rebuttable presumption. A proposed accommodation
that conflicts with a seniority system is presumably unreasonable
but the employee has the chance to show otherwise by proving
special circumstances.90 What kind of special circumstances might
suffice? It might suffice where the employer has retained the right
to change the seniority system unilaterally and exercises that right
frequently or where the seniority system contains so many
exceptions that recognizing another one would not matter.9' One
last point about Justice Breyer's opinion that is vitally important is
that this decision is not limited to seniority systems that are
collectively bargained. 92 It also covers those, like the seniority
system at U.S. Airways, that are unilaterally imposed by
management.
Of the five opinions in Barnett, the single most important
may well be Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion.93 The rule
that Justice O'Connor favors is that the effect of a seniority system
on the reasonableness of an accommodation depends on whether
the seniority system is legally enforceable. 94 This is a very
different rule than that articulated by Justice Breyer. Why then did
she join his opinion? She explains.
85 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 396.
16 Id. at 394.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 394.
91 Id. at 399.92 id. at 404.
93 Id. at 408-12 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
94 Id. at 408 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
[Vol 19
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If each member [of the Court] voted
consistently with his or her beliefs, we
would not agree on a resolution of the
question presented in this case ... In order
that the Court may adopt a rule, and because
I believe the Court's rule will often lead to
the same outcome as the one I would have
adopted, I join the Court's opinion despite
my concerns. 95
Why will the Court's test likely lead to the same outcome?
An unenforceable seniority system typically gives employers the
right to change the system, typically permits exceptions, and
typically contains disclaimers that reduce employee expectations
that the system will be followed.
96
This concurrence could well muddy the waters because
lower courts counting votes, may look to Justice O'Connor's rule.
She recently defended her practice of adding the fifth vote and then
writing a separate concurrence articulating a narrower rule. "'If
you're going to be the majority vote, qualifying your position and
saying 'I agree to this extent only' has the effect of narrowing the
holding and that's not always a bad thing."97 "It might be a
valuable thing to pull back. The Court moves in small steps and
sometimes that is healthy if you don't take a giant step all at once
so you can see how that doctrine is going to pan out."'gs It will be
interesting to see how this pans out in the lower courts.
What is the likely effect of the Court's decision? Walter
Dellinger, who represented US Airways, said, "All truly bona fide
company seniority systems will survive the test the Court sketched
out" in its decision.99  That is certainly true with respect to
collectively bargained seniority systems. But, the answer is far
less certain for seniority systems that are unilaterally imposed, like
95 Id.
96 Id. at 409-10.
97 See Lane, supra note 4.
98 Id.
99 Charles Lane, Justices Further Limit Scope of Disability Act; Law Doesn't
Trump Seniority Policies, WASH. POST, April 30, 2002, at A4 (quoting Walter
Dellinger).
2002
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the one at issue in US Airways, systems that are non-contractual
and modifiable at will. While advocates for the disabled were
disappointed by the decision, they readily admitted that it was not a
total loss for disability plaintiffs. This is true because the rule in
many circuits was that seniority plans automatically trumped the
disabled employee's rights, and that is no longer true under either
Justice Breyer's formulation of the rule or Justice O'Connor's. 100
Before we leave Barnett, just a couple of words about the
other opinions. There were two dissents in the case, one written by
Justice Scalia, 10 1 joined by Justice Thomas, and the other written
by Justice Souter, 1° 2 joined by Justice Ginsburg. The first argues
for a bright line rule whereby all seniority systems trump the
obligation to provide accommodations,' 0 3 and the second argues
for a rule that generally does not permit seniority systems to
interfere with accommodations for the disabled. '
04
Scalia's dissent is all about criticizing the majority for its
"penchant for eschewing clear rules that might avoid litigation"'
10 5
in favor of a rule that Justice Scalia says he simply cannot
understand. 10 6 The Breyer - Scalia disagreement was the subject of
an interesting recent article by Linda Greenhouse, the NY Times
Supreme Court correspondent, where she described the
philosophical divide between Scalia and Breyer as one between
text and context and between bright line rules and flexible
standards. 10 7 Whether interpreting the Constitution or a statute,
Justice Scalia begins and ends with the text, 10 whereas Justice
Breyer believes "a law's purpose and a decision's likely
consequence are the more important elements."' 0 9 So, in public
lectures delivered this past year Justice Scalia declared "[t]he
'oo Barnett, 535 U.S. at 393-94; id at 408, (O'Connor, J., concurring).
101 Id. at 411 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102 Id. at 420 (Souter, J., dissenting).
103 Id. at 413-14 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
4 Id. at 420 (Souter, J., dissenting).
10s Barnett, 535 U.S. at 412 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
16 Id. at 418-19.
107 Linda Greenhouse, The Nation: Judicial Intent, The Competing Visions of
the Role of the Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2002, Section 4, at 3.
108 id.
109 Id.
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Constitution that I interpret and apply is not living, but dead,"" 0
whereas Justice Breyer advocated a dynamic, non-static method of
interpretation.' 11
Barnes v. Gorman 112
The fourth ADA case of the term differs from the others in
that it is not an employment discrimination case but one that arises
under Title II of the ADA which prohibits discrimination against
the disabled in public services. 113 The issue in Barnes v. Gorman
was whether punitive damages could be recovered in a private
cause of action brought under Title 11.114 Utilizing somewhat
convoluted reasoning, the Court concluded that punitive damages
were not available. I I
The case was commenced by a paraplegic who was arrested
and transported to the station house in a van not equipped to
accommodate a wheelchair."l 6 He was belted to a bench in the van,
however, the belts became undone and as a result he fell to the
floor and suffered serious injuries. 117 In a suit under the ADA and
under the Rehabilitation Act," 8 petitioner was awarded $1 million
in compensatory damages and $1.2 million in punitive damages. "19
The district court set aside the punitive damage award saying it
was unavailable in suits under both the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act.' 20 The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that
absent congressional intent to the contrary, the federal courts have
the power to award appropriate relief, and punitive damages are
110Id.
111 Id.
112 536 U.S. 181 (2002).
"i' 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (Section 202 of the ADA prohibits discrimination
against the disabled by public entities and is enforceable through private causes
of action).
114 Barnes, 536 U.S. at 183.
115 Id. at 189.
16 Id. at 183.
117 id.
"1 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (29 U.S.C.
§§ 701-794).
119 Barnes, 536 U.S. at 184.120 Id.
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"an integral part of the common law tradition and the judicial
arsenal." 121 The Supreme Court disagreed. 122
While the ADA's prohibition of discrimination against the
disabled by public entities is enforceable in a private cause of
action, Section 203 of the ADA provides that the "remedies,
procedures and rights" provided in the Rehabilitation Act
govern. 123 The Rehabilitation Act in turn refers to the remedies,
procedures and rights set forth in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. 24  You now see why I referred to the reasoning as
convoluted. It gets worse. Title VI was enacted pursuant to
Congress' spending power, 25 which is in the nature of a contract -
in return for federal funds, the recipient agrees to comply with
federally imposed conditions.126 So just as a contract requires offer
and acceptance of its terms, the legitimacy of what Congress does
under the spending power rests on whether the recipient
voluntarily and knowingly accepted the terms of the grant of
federal money. 12 7 Employing this contract law analogy, the Court
concluded that Title VI funding recipients have not, merely by
accepting funds, impliedly consented to liability for punitive
damages. 128 Since punitive damages cannot be awarded in private
suits brought under Title VI, they cannot be awarded under the
Rehabilitation Act, and consequently, they cannot be awarded
under Title II of the ADA.
Although no justice dissented from the conclusion, there is
disagreement about the Court's reasoning. Why should the Court
rely on an analogy to contract law when the ADA was not enacted
pursuant to the spending clause, particularly when two alternative
121 Id. (quoting Gorman v. Easley, 257 F.3d 738, 745 (2001)).
122 Id. at 189.
123 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified at
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
124 Civil Rights Act of 1964 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
225 Barnes, 536 U.S. at 185-86; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
126 Id. (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17
(1981)).
227 Id. (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17).
128 Id. at 188 (noting that community standards of fairness support the Court's
decision because to award punitive damages for violations of Title VI would
create unusual and disproportionate exposure to liability by all recipients
accepting federal funding under the Act).
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grounds existed for the decision: 129 first that municipalities are not
subject to punitive damage awards; 13 and second that Congress
did not intend to authorize a punitive damage remedy for violations
of Title Il of the ADA.'31
EEOC v. Waffle House 132
This case is the latest in a series of cases assessing the
effectiveness of arbitration clauses in employment discrimination
cases, and it is the single victory for ADA plaintiffs from last
year's Supreme Court docket. While this case arose in the context
of the ADA, it is important to note that the decision extends to all
employment discrimination cases. 133 Last year, we discussed
Circuit City v. Adams, 134 where the Court held that employees who
sign employment contracts containing arbitration clauses are
bound by the arbitration clause. 135 These clauses were found not
to be within the statutory exemption of the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA). 136 One issue left unresolved by Circuit City was the scope
of the EEOC's power to pursue claims on behalf of discrimination
claimants who would themselves be precluded from seeking
judicial relief by virtue of a binding arbitration agreement. Some
circuits had held that the EEOC has the authority to sue employers
for back pay, reinstatement and damages on behalf of
discrimination claimants, whereas other circuits had held that the
EEOC could not seek victim specific relief.
137
129 Id. at 191 (Stevens, J., concurring) (explaining Title II of the ADA was not
enacted pursuant to Congress' spending power).
130 Barnes, 536 U.S. at 191.
131 Id.
132 EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
133 id.
134 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
135 Id.
136 Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended
at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (2000)). On May 1, 2002, Senator Edward M. Kennedy, a
Massachusetts Democrat, introduced the Preservation of Civil Rights
Protections Act of 2002 that would effectively undo this result. See S. 2435,
107th Cong. (2002). This bill seeks to amend the Federal Arbitration Act to
exclude all employment contracts from arbitration.
137 Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 285.
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In Waffle House, Eric Baker was hired as a minimum wage
cook and required to sign an arbitration agreement. 38 Sixteen days
after he started working, he suffered a seizure and was
discharged. 39 Baker filed a charge of discrimination with the
EEOC alleging that his discharge violated the ADA. 140  After
investigating, the EEOC filed an enforcement action against
Waffle House, in which the EEOC sought injunctive relief, back
pay, reinstatement, and compensatory and punitive damages.14 '
The Court of Appeals held that when an employee has signed a
mandatory arbitration agreement, the EEOC is precluded from
seeking victim specific relief and the only remedy available in an
enforcement action is injunctive relief. 42
The Supreme Court, with Justice Stevens writing for a six
to three majority, reversed, holding that the EEOC may seek victim
specific relief. The ADA provides that the EEOC has the same
enforcement powers with respect to the ADA as it has under Title
VII. 144 Thus, the opinion is based on an analysis of Title VII,
which, according to the Court, unambiguously authorizes the
EEOC to bring an enforcement action in which it seeks to enjoin
the employer from engaging in unlawful employment practices,
and to pursue reinstatement, back pay and compensatory or
punitive damages. 45 The Court found that the FAA, which was
enacted to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements, 46 in no way changes this result. It merely directs
courts to place arbitration agreements on equal footing with other
contracts but it certainly does not require parties (such as the
EEOC) to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so. 141 Since
arbitration under the FAA is a matter of consent, not coercion, and
118 Id. at 282-83.
9 Id. at 283.
140 id.
141 Id.
142 Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 283.
143 Id.
144Id. at 283; 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2000).
141 Id. at 283.
146 Id. at 289 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20
(1991)).
147 Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 293.
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since the EEOC was not a party to the contract containing the
arbitration clause, the contract cannot bind the EEOC.1
48
Left unresolved by the decision is the effect of a settlement
or arbitrated judgment on the relief that the EEOC seeks. Certainly,
if the claimant failed to mitigate his or her damages or accepted a
monetary settlement, any recovery sought by the EEOC would be
limited accordingly. 149 Could the Court stop an ongoing arbitration
while the EEOC prosecuted its enforcement claim? The governing
principle would be that any double recovery would of course be
precluded. 150
Justice Thomas authors a dissent, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia.' 51 The ex-chairman of the EEOC
reads the statute and legislative history of Title VII quite
differently from the majority, concluding that an authorization to
seek relief is different from an authorization to obtain relief.
Thomas argues that the statute only authorizes the award of
appropriate relief and victim specific relief is not appropriate, and
in any event, the Court's holding undermines the liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements.
152
What is the practical significance of this decision? On the
one hand, one could speculate, as the majority did, 153 that since the
EEOC files suit in such a small fraction of cases, this decision has
little import. In a footnote, the Court notes "it is worth recognizing
that the EEOC files suit in less than one percent of the charges
filed each year."' 54 In fiscal year 2000, for example, the EEOC
received almost 80,000 charges of employment discrimination,
found reasonable cause in more than 8000, but only filed 291
lawsuits and intervened in 111 others. 55  There is, however,
another way of looking at this. Given the fact that approximatel!y
six million employees are covered by arbitration agreements,'
many of whom are low wage workers who cannot afford private
141 Id. at 284.
149 Id. at 296.
5 0 Id. at 297.
"'' Id. at 298 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
152 Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 308 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
113 Id. at 290 n.7.
154 id.
155 Id.
156 Id.
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arbitration, and that the number of employees covered by
arbitration agreements is growing rapidly, the role of the EEOC
acquires far greater significance. An amicus brief filed for the
Council for Employment Law Equity made the point that given the
prevalence of arbitration agreements, it is particularly important
that the agency has the ability to bring to the court system certain
precedent-setting cases as a super-police officer over the
arbitration process.' 57 Over the past ten years, the EEOC has filed
more than 3000 suits against employers recovering more than
$500,000,000 in damages.158 When viewed in that light, EEOC
Chairman Cari Dominguez may be right when she said the ruling
"reaffirms the significance of the EEOC's public enforcement
role."'
159
The other consequence of this decision is the one
emphasized in an amicus brief filed on behalf of the EEOC by the
Attorneys General of twenty-eight states who feared that a ruling
against the EEOC would compromise their ability to bring
consumer protection cases where the consumer has signed a
purchase or credit agreement containing an arbitration clause.160
The Court also decided two non-ADA cases and ruled in
favor of the plaintiffs in both.16 1 They are both procedural in
nature, one raising a pleading question, and the other a statute of
limitations question. They are both important cases but we can
review them rather quickly.
,57 See generally, Brief of Amici Curiae Council for Employment Law Equity,
EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279 (2002) (No. 99-1823).
158 See http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/litigation.html (last visited April 29, 2003).
15 Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court Ruling Defends Power of EEOC, USA.
TODAY, Jan. 16, 2002, at B2 (quoting Cari Dominguez).
160 Brief of Amici Curiae at 4, EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279 (2002)
(No. 99-1823).
161 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, (2002); Nat'l. R.R. Passenger Corp.
v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
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Swierkiewicz v. Sorema 162
Swierkiewicz raises the question of what an employment
discrimination plaintiff has to allege in his or her complaint in
order to withstand a motion to dismiss. 163 As all employment
discrimination practitioners know, the blueprint for establishing a
case of employment discrimination based on circumstantial
evidence was set forth by the Supreme Court many years ago in
McDonnell Douglas, Corp. v. Green.164 In order to make out a
prima facie case of employment discrimination pursuant to the
McDonnell Douglas methodology, plaintiff must prove four things:
1) that plaintiff is a member of a protected category, 2) that
plaintiff was qualified for the job or promotion she sought, 3) that
she was denied the job or promotion, and 4) that the denial
occurred under circumstances that support an inference of
discrimination which typically, although not always, is done by
showing that the employer offered the position to someone outside
the protected category. 65 Once the plaintiff establishes this four-
part test, the defendant has the opportunity to show a non-
discriminatory reason for the decision, at which point the plaintiff
must show that the employer's proffered reason is merely a pretext
for discrimination. 166
In Swierkiewicz, plaintiff's claims of discrimination based
on national origin and age were dismissed pursuant to the Second
Circuit's heightened pleading rule that requires a plaintiff in an
employment discrimination complaint to allege facts constituting a
prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas.167
Other circuits do not impose this pleading requirement. 168
Interestingly, the Bush administration sided with the plaintiff in
162 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
163 Id. at 508.
'64 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
165 Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510 (citing McDonnell Douglas, Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
'66 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.167 Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 509.
168 Id. at 509-10.
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this case, and the Solicitor General filed a brief arguing against the
Second Circuit rule. 1
69
In a short unanimous decision by Justice Thomas, the Court
held that the four-part prima facie case established by McDonnell
Douglas is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.1
70
Imposing a heightened pleading rule would convert the McDonnell
Douglas formula from a flexible test into a rigid mechanized one
and would conflict with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)
which provides for simplified pleading standards rather than
technical rules of pleading.
17 1
The consequence of this decision is certainly significant
here in the Second Circuit. It will permit virtually all employment
discrimination complaints to proceed at least through discovery,
which is often tremendously important in these cases as it is the
only way for plaintiffs to get at the information they need
regarding the defendant's records of hiring and promotion
decisions.
National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan 1
72
Morgan raises the issue of whether employment
discrimination claimants may recover for discriminatory acts
occurring outside the 180 or 300 day limitation period for filing
claims with the EEOC.1
73
Abner Morgan worked for Amtrak and claimed he was
harassed and disciplined more harshly than other employees solely
because of his race. 174 He filed a charge of discrimination with the
EEOC complaining of acts occurring within 300 days of the filing,
but also of acts occurring outside that time period. 175 The statute
requires that a charge be filed within either 180 or 300 days after
169 Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission as Amici Curiae supporting petitioner, at 11-12, Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema, 534 U.S. 506 (No. 00-1853).
170 Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510.
171 id. at 512.
172 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
173 Id. at 104-05.
114 Id. at 105.
'
75 Id. at 106.
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the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. 7 6 The circuit
courts have employed different rules for dealing with this problem.
Some circuits have found the earlier conduct actionable under a
continuing violation theory. 177 Others use a multi-factor approach
which takes into account whether the untimely acts involve the
same type of discrimination; whether the incidents are recurring or
independent isolated acts; and whether the earlier acts have
sufficient permanency to trigger the employee's awareness of and
duty to challenge the conduct.1
7 8
The Supreme Court, with Justice Thomas somewhat
surprisingly siding with, and writing for, the four "liberal"
members of the Court, distinguished discrete discriminatory acts
from acts giving rise to hostile environment claims.' 79 Discrete
discriminatory acts occur on the day that they happen, which is
when the time limitation period begins to run.'8 0 Thus, discrete
discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred and that does
not change even when those acts are related to acts which were
timely.18 ' Each discrete discriminatory act starts the clock running
anew. 12 If any prior untimely acts exist they may be used by the
plaintiff as background evidence in support of a timely claim,
however these acts are not themselves actionable. 183 Termination,
failure to promote, denial of transfer or refusal to hire are all
examples of discrete acts.' 84 Such discrete acts are not actionable
176 Id. This 180 or 300 day requirement is contingent upon whether or not a
particular state has its own human rights agency for handling such complaints.
id.
77 Morgan, 536 U.S. at 106-07.
178 Id. at 107 n.3.
179 id.
SO Id. at 110 (stating that "[a] party, therefore, must file a charge within either
180 or 300 days of the date of the act or lose the ability to recover for it").
181 Id. at 113.
182 Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113 ("The existence of past acts and the employee's
prior knowledge of their occurrence, however, does not bar employees from
filing charges about related discrete acts so long as the acts are independently
discriminatory and charges addressing those acts are themselves timely filed.").
183 Id.
Id. at 114.
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on the theory that they are part of a continuing violation. 85 Rather,
they are separate actionable unlawful discriminatory practices.
186
In contrast are acts giving rise to hostile environment
claims.' 87 Hostile environment claims arise when the workplace is
permeated with "discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and
insult"'188 that is sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the
conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive
working environment.189 In contrast to discrete acts of
discrimination, a hostile environment claim typically may not be
predicated on a single act of harassment.' 90 Hostile environment
claims by their very nature involve repeated conduct and thus
cannot be said to have occurred on a particular day.191 Since the
timely filing rule requires the filing of a claim within 180 or 300
days "after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred"
and since a hostile work environment claim is necessarily
comprised of a series of acts that collectively constitute an
unlawful employment practice, it does not matter that some of the
acts occurred outside the statutory time period so long as an act
contributing to that claim occurs within the filing period. 192 The
Court rejects the rule employed by some circuits that permits a
consideration of earlier acts only when it would be unreasonable to
expect the plaintiff to sue before the statute ran on that conduct.' 
93
Thus the plaintiff friendly rule that the Court announces is that in
order to be timely, the employee need only file a charge within 180
or 300 days of any act that is part of the same hostile work
environment claim. 194 This is a plaintiff friendly rule because
under this decision the period covered may extend well beyond the
185 id.
.
86Id. at 114-15.
' Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115.
188 Id. at 116 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys. 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Meritor Say.
Bank, FSB v. Visnon, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986)).
189 d. (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21; Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67).
190Id. at 115.
191 Id.
'
92 Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117.
'
93 Id. at 117 n.ll.
194 Id. at 118.
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300 days - in fact the decision makes clear that it may extend for a
number of years. 1
95
What about employers who are prejudiced by unreasonable
delays in filing charges? Justice Thomas suggests that such
employers are not without recourse.' 96  Courts may rely on
equitable doctrines such as waiver, estoppel, laches and equitable
tolling to protect such employers from unreasonable and
prejudicial delay.' 97
As I indicated earlier, this is a very significant case because
it removes what had been a real problem facing sexual and racial
harassment plaintiffs in several circuits that had imposed much
stricter rules regarding these time limits.
'
9
' Id. at 118-19.
'96Id. at 121.
9 Morgan, 536 U.S. at 121-22.
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